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Abstract 
 
 The objective of this study is to assess sustainable development and the potential for 
green growth of the marine capture fisheries in Vietnam. We use “standard” bio-economic 
models with additional terms to correct some of ecosystem externalities and to define reference 
points for the fisheries. The results show that Vietnam's marine capture fisheries are 
unsustainable and the fishing effort needs to be reduced about 0.35 and 0.39 of present effort 
in order to achieve the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) and maximum economic yield (MEY), 
respectively. If ecosystem externalities are taken into account, the situation is even worse.  The 
potential for green growth in the fisheries  is estimated to be about 7.3 billion USD, higher than 
the export value for fisheries and aquaculture products in Vietnam in 2016. Green growth 
policies for the fisheries include public subsidies to environmentally friendly industries, 
reducing the “trash” fish catch and more efficient regulations more effectively enforced. 
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1. Introduction 
The fisheries sector represents an important source of economic growth, employment, 
nutrition, and foreign exchange in Vietnam (McCoy, Thurlow et al. 2010). Over five percent 
of export earnings stem from fisheries aquaculture products, which is worth US$ 7.05 billion 
in 2016 (Anon 2016). There are approximately 130 commercially valuable species in Vietnam's 
sea  waters with a total official fisheries catch of 3.07 million MT in 2016 (Anon 2016). There 
are five main fishing areas in Vietnam: the Gulf of Tonkin, shared with China; the Central area 
of Vietnam; the South-eastern area of Vietnam; the South-western area of Vietnam (part of the 
Gulf of Thailand), shared with Cambodia and Thailand; and the Central South China Sea. 
Vietnam's marine fisheries are concentrated on coastal waters, which has resulted in heavy 
pressure on near-shore fisheries  resources (Pomeroy, Thi Nguyen et al. 2009). Near-shore 
fisheries are considered to be over-exploited by fishers and the government and the proportion 
of low value/”trash” fish in the total catch of these fisheries continues to rise (Edwards, Tuan 
et al. 2004, Pomeroy, Thi Nguyen et al. 2009). The composition of low value/”trash” fish in the 
	 2
total catch varies depending on the type of gear used to fish and the fishing grounds, but most 
are from trawling (Edwards, Tuan et al. 2004). In 2004, the catch composition (%) of “trash” 
fish in landings by pair trawl in the the Gulf of Tonkin was about 70% and 42% in the Southeast 
area  (Son, Thi et al. 2005). Long (2001) estimated that the real catches in the Gulf of Tonkin 
had exceeded maximum sustainable yield (MSY) since 1994 (Long 2001). Thanh (2011) also 
showed that the shrimp trawl fisheries in the Gulf of Tonkin were fully exploited both in terms 
of maximizing yield and maximizing profits.  As the result, the fishing effort in that area should 
be reduced by roughly 12-44% to achieve the MSY and 46-61% to reach the maximum 
economic yield (MEY). Agencies such as the provincial Departments of Capture Fisheries and 
Resource Protection (SubDecafirep) have lacked the budgetary resources to provide the 
required management, monitoring, surveillance or regulation enforcement in both Vietnam’s 
inshore and offshore waters (Zweig, Thong et al. 2005). In addition, fishing licenses are 
normally imposed and granted on the basis of submitting a number of supporting documents 
such as vessel inspection, registration papers and a small license fee (proportional to engine 
size). In this case, the registration for a license is not an obstacle for joining the sector; therefore, 
marine capture fisheries  in Vietnam are, in fact, an open access resource (Thanh 2011). With 
the increasing population pressure and the development of more effective (and/or destructive) 
fishing gears, inshore resources have been increasingly overexploited. One possible solution to 
these issues sustainability in the Vietnamese marine fisheries is the adoption of green growth 
principles. Green growth is defined as fostering economic growth and development while 
ensuring that natural assets continue to provide the resources and environmental services on 
which our well-being relies (OECD 2011). Green growth could be seen as part of sustainable 
development in the sense that only a subset of the capital stocks relevant to meeting the needs 
of future generations is explicitly considered (Schmalensee 2012). Green growth is also 
described as growth that is efficient in its use of natural resources, clean (as it minimizes 
pollution and environmental impacts) and resilient (as it accounts for natural hazards) (WB 
2012). Sumaila (2011) has defined green growth in fisheries as moving from the current 
situation where fishing is unsustainable to one where fishing is equal to or less than the growth 
of wild stocks. However, green growth in fisheries could be understood in much broader terms 
than just reducing the growth of overfishing. Green growth in fisheries may include reducing 
recruit overfishing and correcting all ecosystem externalities which can affect fisheries  
productivity (Ryan, Holland et al. 2014). These externalities may include habitat degradation 
by using destructive fishing gears, crowding fishing, bycatch of forage species or juveniles of 
the target species. Green growth in fisheries can be achieved by developing environmental 
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friendly fishing industries and using an ecosystem approach to correct environmental market 
failures (Nielsen, Ravensbeck et al. 2014).  
Traditional bio-economic models do not generally take into account ecosystem externalities 
(Pascoe, Hutton et al. 2018); therefore, using standard reference points derived from these 
models to assess sustainable development of fisheries is questionable (Larkin 1977, Downing 
and Plante 1993). Larkin (1977) pointed out that the maximum sustained yield (MSY) was not 
sufficient for assessing sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources. He also suggested that a 
more sophisticated concept urgently needs to be developed. Downing and Plante (1993) noted 
that sustainable fish yields should be lower for larger fish species, at high latitudes, and higher 
for higher temperatures or under more eutrophic conditions. They recommended that 
sustainable yields are about 10% of biological production (Downing and Plante 1993). Labrosse 
et al (2000) also estimated  that the MSY of demersal reefal and lagoonal finfish in the Northern 
Province of New Caledonia was about 10 % of the total stocks assessed in the Northern 
Province.  
Hilborn et al (1995) noted that temporal changes in environmental conditions may affect 
sustainable yields. He suggested that successful management of fisheries will rest on better 
institutional arrangements for creating incentives for fishermen and controlling fishing 
activities.  Hilborn (2007) provided an additional emphasis on protection of non-target species, 
and on protection of ecosystems beside the traditional maximum sustainable yield in order to 
have successful fisheries. Pauly et al (2002) recommended tools for sustainable fisheries 
including zoning the oceans, reducing subsidies and fishing capacity. Stobutzki et al (2001) 
raised issues of fishery bycatch and impacts of trawling on bycatch species. Adrianto et al 
(2005) proposed a framework for analyzing fishery sustainability indicators by involving the 
fishery stakeholders in the Yoron Island, Japan. Pascoe and Hillary (2016) showed that 
management of fisheries in Australia targeting maximum economic yield (MEY) while New 
Zealand targets maximum sustainable yield. Pascoe et al (2015) proposed a framework to 
estimate target reference points for multispecies and mixed fisheries. Pascoe et al (2018) 
developed a generic multispecies bioeconomic model to include changes in consumer surplus 
as well as the inclusion of non-market values associated with bycatch.  
 The objective of this study is to assess sustainable development and potential green 
growth for the marine capture fisheries  in Vietnam. We use “standard” bio-economic models 
with additional terms to correct some of ecosystem externalities and to define reference points 
for the fisheries. Aggregate catch and effort data from 1976 to 2016 and other economic data 
for the fisheries were collected from the Vietnam Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
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Development (MARD). The reference points of the fisheries  are analyzed to assess sustainable 
development and the potential for green growth of the marine capture fisheries  in Vietnam.
   
 The paper will be constructed as follows: the next section presents the data and the 
models used. The following sections describe the empirical results from the models and green 
growth policies for marine capture fisheries  in Vietnam. The last section summarizes the main 
conclusions. 
 
2. Methods and data  
2.1. Methods 
 In this section, we use “standard” bio-economic models with additional terms to correct 
some of ecosystem externalities to define reference points for a fishery with respect to 
sustainable development and the potential for green growth.  
A general growth model for an exploited stock by a fishery with fishing effort (E) and 
stock biomass (X) can be expressed as follows (Clark 1990): 
݀ܺ
݀ݐ ൌ ܨሺܺሻ െ ܪሺܧ, ܺሻ																																																						ሺ1ሻ 
 Where: F (X) is the biological growth of the stock; H (E, X) is the production function 
or harvest function of the fishery, which depends on fishing effort (E) and stock biomass (X). 
 The biological growth of the stock F(X) was first proposed as a population model by 
P.F. Verhulst in 1838 (Verhulst 1838, Clark 1990): 
ܨሺܺሻ ൌ ݎܺሺ1 െ ܺܭሻ																																																														ሺ2ሻ 
 Where: K is the environmental carrying capacity; r is in this case is called the intrinsic 
growth rate.  
 The harvest function of a fishery is often assumed to be expressed by a Cobb-Douglas 
function (Clark and Munro 1975, Clark 1990, Eide, Skjold et al. 2003): 
ܪሺܧ, ܺሻ ൌ ݍܧܺ																																																							ሺ3ሻ 
Where:  
E  fishing effort  
X  stock biomass 
q  gear and stock specific constant, referred to as the catchability coefficient.  
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 At the steady state conditions (equilibrium), 
ௗ௑
ௗ௧ ൌ 0,	 the sustainable yield can be 
derived from the following equation (Clark 1990): 
            (4) 
 We assume that fishing effort (E) is measured by aggregated horse power and the 
biomass variable X consists of a number of different harvested species (to be measured in tons). 
From (2), (3) and (4), we will have: 
ݍܧܺ ൌ ݎܺ ൬1 െ ܺܭ൰ ↔ ݍܧ ൌ ݎ െ
ݎܺ
ܭ ↔ ܺ ൌ ܭ െ
ܭݍܧ
ݎ 												ሺ5ሻ 
The “standard” sustainable yield for a given level of effort: 
ܪ௦ሺܧሻ ൌ ݍܭܧ െ ݍ
ଶܭ
ݎ ܧ
ଶ ൌ ߛ଴ܧ ൅ ߛଵ	ܧଶ												ሺ6ሻ			 
 where  ߛ଴ ൌ ݍܭ;	ߛଵ ൌ െ ௤
మ௄
௥  
Pascoe et al (2018) and Armstrong et al (2017) have both included the externalities, as 
cost in the profit  and objective function, however, they do not change the catch and growth 
function. Pascoe et al (2018) includes non-market value (as a cost) for iconic species bycatch, 
which by definition has nothing to do with the growth function for the target species. Armstrong 
et al (2017) includes both use and non-use values of habitat (in their case study they use cold-
water coral habitats) in the profit function of the fishery. The use-value is the present value of 
cold-water corals, while the non-use-values are the cultural value of cold-water corals. In this 
paper, we have included the externalities differently compare to Pascoe et al (2018) and 
Armstrong et al (2017) since we include bycatch (trash fish) and habitat damage by changing 
the sustainable yield. It is assume that bycatch (trah fish) and habitat damage are caused by 
non-selective gears (e.g. trawls) and they are depend on fishing effort (E). We introduce 
additional terms to account for the bycatch L= αE and habitat damage B=βE associated with 
fishing activities, where E is fishing effort and α, β are parameters. The sustainable yield that 
account for ecosystem externalities for a given level of effort: 
ܪ௦௘ሺܧሻ ൌ ݍܭܧ െ ݍ
ଶܭ
ݎ ܧ
ଶ ൌ ߜܧ ൅ ߛଵ	ܧଶ												ሺ6′ሻ 
 where  ߜ ൌ ߛ଴ െ ߙ െ ߚ;	 
The sustainable catch per unit of effort (CPUE) for a given level of effort : 
Without externalities 
),()( XEHXF 
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ܥܷܲܧ௦ሺܧሻ ൌ ܪ௦ሺܧሻܧ ൌ ߛ଴ ൅ ߛଵܧ																						ሺ7ሻ 
With externalities 
ܥܷܲܧ௦௘ሺܧሻ ൌ ܪ௦௘ሺܧሻܧ ൌ ߜ ൅ ߛଵܧ																					ሺ7′ሻ 
 Total sustainable revenue (TR) and total cost (TC) of the fishery are defined (Schaefer 
1954, Clark 1990) as: 
ܴܶ	 ൌ 	݌ܪ௦ሺܧሻ; 		ܶܥሺݐሻ ൌ ܿܧ																																		ሺ8ሻ 
Where 
 p  constant price per unit of harvested biomass 
c  constant cost per unit of effort 
 The difference between total sustainable revenue TR and total cost TC is called the 
sustainable economic rent provided by the fishery resource at each given level of effort E: 
Without externalities 
ߨ௦ሺݐሻ ൌ ݌ܪ௦ሺܧሻ െ ܿܧ ൌ ሺ݌ߛ଴ െ ܿሻܧ ൅ ݌ߛଵ	ܧଶ												ሺ9ሻ 
With externalities 
ߨ௦௘ሺݐሻ ൌ ݌ܪ௦௘ሺܧሻ െ ܿܧ ൌ ሺ݌ߜ െ ܿሻܧ ൅ ݌ߛଵ	ܧଶ												ሺ9′ሻ 
 The equilibrium level of the fishing effort that produces the maximum sustainable yield 
(MSY), is determined by differentiating Hs(E) and Hse(E) from equation (6) and (6’) with 
respect to E. The results are shown in Table 1. Equation (9) implies that accounting for 
ecosystem externalities such as habitat damage and bycatch would decrease the sustainable 
economic rent from ߨ௦ to ߨ௦௘. 
Table1. MSY and EMSY for the Verhulst-Schaefer models 
 Effort at MSY(EMSY)        MSY 
Standard ܧெௌ௒ ൌ െ ߛ଴2ߛଵ ൌ
ݎ
2ݍ	 ܯܻܵ ൌ െ
ߛ଴ଶ
4ߛଵ ൌ
ݎܭ
4  
Ecosystem 
externalities ܧெௌ௒ ൌ െ
ߜ
2ߛଵ ൌ
ݎሺݍܭ െ ߙ െ ߚሻ
2ݍଶܭ  ܯܻܵ ൌ െ
ߜଶ
4ߛଵ ൌ
ݎሺݍܭ െ ߙ െ ߚሻଶ
4ݍଶܭ  
 
Maximum economic yield (MEY), usually less than MSY, is the degree of exploitation 
that provides maximum economic benefit or profit to society. If a fishery is an open access 
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resource (the resource rent equals zero), the resource rent at MEY is the potential for green 
growth (Nielsen, Ravensbeck et al. 2014). The equilibrium level of fishing effort that produces 
the maximum economic rent is found by differentiating πs(E) and πse(E from equation (9) and 
(9’) with respect to E. The results are presented in Table 2. 
Table.2. MEY and EMEY for the Verhulst-Schaefer models 
 Effort at MEY(EMEY) MEY 
Standard ܧொ௒ ൌ ܿ െ ݌ߛ଴2݌ߛଵ ൌ
ݎሺ݌ݍܭ െ ܿሻ
2݌ݍଶܭ  ܯܧܻ ൌ
ܿଶ െ ݌ଶߛ଴ଶ
4݌ଶߛଵ ൌ
ݎሺ݌ଶݍଶܭଶ െ ܿଶሻ
4݌ݍଶܭ  
Ecosystem 
externalities 
ܧொ௒ ൌ ܿ െ ݌ߛ଴2݌ߛଵ
ൌ ݎሺ݌ݍܭ െ ݌ߙ െ ݌ߚ െ ܿሻ2݌ݍଶܭ  
ܯܧܻ ൌ ܿ
ଶ െ ݌ଶߛ଴ଶ
4݌ଶߛଵ
ൌ ݎሾ݌
ଶሺݍܭ െ ߙ െ ߚሻଶ െ ܿଶሿ
4݌ݍଶܭ  
 
 Table 1, 2 show that standard reference points (MSY, EMSY,	MEY and EMEY) are not 
only depend on traditional factors such as intrinsic growth rate (r), technology (q) and carrying 
capacity (K) but also factors that account for ecosystem externalities such as habitat damage (
α) and bycatch (β). Downing and Plante (1993) and Labrosse et al (2000) suggested that 
sustainable yields (correcting for ecosystem externalities) are about 10% of biological 
production or about 20% of the traditional MSY (about 50% of biological production). It 
implies that by taking into account ecosystem externalities, the estimated coefficient γ0 would 
reduce by 80%. According to MARD (2012), gillnet, longline and trawl are the main fishing 
gears in Vietnam. Among these fishing gears, trawl is the least selective fishing gear and the 
most harmful fishing gear for habitats. Trawlers (single and pair) account for about 18% of the 
total fishing vessels in Vietnam (MARD 2012). We assume that α and β, accounting for a part 
of ecosystem externalities, reduce 18% the estimated coefficient γ0 (δ=0.82 γ0). 
Green growth policies for fisheries require a focus on three aspects (Hallegatte, Heal et al. 
2012): (i) optimize the effective quantity of production inputs E and X in equation (3); in this 
case, production factors are complements therefore protecting the environment is necessary to 
maintain economic production; (ii) produce productivity gains by correcting environmental 
market failures and enhancing efficiency of resource use (e.g. at steady state conditions); (iii) 
shift the production frontier by correcting all ecosystem externalities which can affect the 
productivity in fisheries (e.g. reducing bycatch, improving habitats and increasing K). 
2.2. Data 
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 Marine capture fisheries in Vietnam play an important role both in term of production 
and employment. The marine capture production in Vietnam accounted for about 46% of the 
total fisheries  and aquaculture production in 2016 (Anon 2016). Gillnet, longline, trawl (single 
and pair) and purse seine  are traditional fishing gears in Vietnam. There were about 42 
thousand gillneters, 21 thousand longliners, 20 thousand trawlers and 4.5 thousand purse 
seiners, accounted for about 37%, 19%, 18% and 4% of total fishing boats respectively in 2012 
(figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1. Fishing gears in Vietnam in 2012 
Source of data: MARD 
  
 Most of fishing boats are small scale with engine lower than 50 HP (73%) and exploit 
coastal areas.  There were about 19% of fishing boats to be considered as offshore fishing boats 
with engine higher than 90 HP where only 4% of total fishing boats with engine higher than 
400 HP in 2012 (figure 2).  
Trawl	
18% Purse	seine
4%
Gillnet
37%
Longline
19%
Others
22%
	 9
 
Figure 2. Capacity of fishing fleet in Vietnam in 2012 
Source of data: MARD 
 
 Time series data of annual catch and fishing effort collected from Ministry of 
Agricultural and Rural Development (MARD) for the period from 1976 to 2016 were used in 
this study. We selected data on aggregate horse power to represent fishing effort (denoted 
capacity). The catch, effort and CPUE data for the entire Vietnamese marine fisheries are 
described in table 3. 
Table 3. Summary statistics of catch, effort and CPUE data (1976-2016) 
 
Variable Number of Observations Mean 
Standard 
deviation Min value 
Max value 
Catch (tons) 41 1,307,975 821,044 377,192 3,076,000 
Effort (HP) 41 2,082,611 1,883,244 453,871 6,123,000 
CPUE  41 0.67 0.33 0.25 1.22 
 
 Data from the Vietnam House Living Standards Survey (VHLSS) (2014) were used to 
estimate p (price per unit of catch) and ch (cost per unit of catch) (Table 4). 
Table 4. Summary statistics of price and cost data (VHLSS 2014) 
 
Variable Number of Observations Mean 
Standard 
deviation Min value 
Max value 
P (million VND) 670 59.20 71.23 1 1036 
ch (million VND) 670 12.69 34.45 0.08 782 
 
 
 
 
 
 
>	400	HP
4% 250‐<400	HP
6% 150‐<250	HP
5%
90	‐ <	150	
HP
4%50	‐ <	90	HP
8%
20	‐ <50	HP
25%
<	20	HP
48%
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3. Empirical results 
The results show that fishing effort since 2012 (about 8.53 million HP) has exceeded 
the EMSY (figure 3a and 3b), thus the exploitation of Vietnam's seafood is demonstrably 
unsustainable. Based on the relationship between catch per unit effort (CPUE) and fishing effort 
(Equation 6), we can derive the following model (C is constant): 
Table 5: Estimated coefficients for the Verhulst-Schaefer model 
Variables Estimates (standard deviation) 
C 
Capacityt 
R2 
F statistic 
DW statistic 
Rho 
0.93 * (0.15) 
-5.95E-08 * (1.88E-08) 
0.41 
26.68 
1.68 
0.88 
The dependent variable is CPUEt, * p <0.05, the number of observations is 41, using the 
autocorrelation model Prais-Winsten AR (1). 
 
Thus, the estimated coefficients are: γ0 = 0.93, γ1 = -5.95E-8. The MSY and fishing 
effort at MSY are calculated as follows: 
ܯܻܵ ൌ ߛ଴
ଶ
4ߛଵ ൌ 3.63	ሺ݈݈݉݅݅݋݊	ݐ݋݊ݏሻ;	ܯܵ ாܻ ൌ 2.44	ሺ݈݈݉݅݅݋݊	ݐ݋݊ݏሻ 
 Fishing effort at MSY  
ܧெௌ௒ ൌ ߛ଴2ߛଵ ൌ 7.82	ሺ݈݈݉݅݅݋݊	ܪܲሻ;	ܧெௌ௒௘ ൌ 6.41	ሺ݈݈݉݅݅݋݊	ܪܲሻ 
 
Figure 3a. Catch and capacity for Vietnam marine marine capture fisheries  
Source of data: MARD 
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 Figure 3b. Catch and CPUE for Vietnam marine marine capture fisheries  
Source of data: MARD  
 Figure 3a shows that the optimal effort has been exceeded but catch continues to 
increase. One of explainations is that the catch increases but the effeciency (CPUE) of the 
fisheries is declining (figure 3b).  Since CPUE is one index of stock then maybe the catch 
inceased by running down the stock.  
 The mean value of price and cost per unit of catch according to the VHLSS1 2014 data 
(table 4) are: 
p = 59.20 (1000 VND/kg) = 59.20 million VND/ton 
ch = 12.69 (1000 VND/kg) = 12.69 million VND/ton 
 We decided to use 59.20 million VND/ton as the price estimate for the model. With 
statistical data from GSO of marine catch (about 3 million tons) and the total capacity (12 
million HP) in 2016 , the average cost per unit effort is caculated as follows: 
ܿ	 ൌ ܶܥܧ ൌ
ܪܿ௛
ܧ ൌ 	3.23	݈݈݉݅݅݋݊	ܸܰܦ/ܪܲ 
  The reference points are: MEY = 3.62 million (tons); EMEY = 7.36 million (HP);  MEYe 
= 2.44 million (tons); EMEYe = 6.41 million (HP);  and the results can be summarized in table 6. 
The results show that the potential gains of correcting some of ecosystem externalities (bycatch 
and habitat destruction) is about 2.4 billion USD. 
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 Table 6. MSY, MEY, EMSY and EMEY for the marine capture fisheries  in Vietnam 
 MSY  
(millon tons) 
EMSY  
(million HP) 
MEY  
(million tons) 
EMEY  
(million HP) 
Standard 3.63 7.82 3.62 7.36 
Ecosystem 
externalities 
2.44 6.41 2.44 6.41 
 
 
Figure 4. Catch and modeled sustainable yield 
	
 In figure 4, the sustainable yield and MSY are derived from the Verhulst-Schaefer 
models. The catch data in the light blue diamonds is annual catch statistics. There seem to be 
three trend lines in the annual catch statistics. First was almost vertical – a doubling in catch 
with almost no increase in fishing effort, it was coressponding to the period from 1970s to the 
end of 1980s under the planned economy (figure 3). For the second period, there was a steady 
increase in catch with increasing effort up to about 4 millon HP, it was corresponding to the 
period from early 1990s to early 2000s under open door policy from the goverment. For the 
third period, there was a jump to a new trend line from 2000s but then a steady increase again 
since the late 2000s. This was the period when the goverment had provided subsidies to the 
offshore fishing program (from 1997 to 2003) and Vietnam joined WTO in 2007. The fishing 
effort has significantly increased due to market driven incentives. The EMSY (about 7.82 million 
HP) has reached since 2012. The fishing effort in 2016 (about 12 million HP, figure 3) was 
more than 1.5 times the fishing effort corresponding to the MSY (EMSY). 
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 Figure 5 shows TR, TC and MEY derived from the Verhulst-Schaefer models.  The 
fishing effort in 2016  (about 12 million HP, figure 3) was more than 1.6 times the fishing 
effort corresponding to the MEY (EMEY is about 7.36 million HP, figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. Total cost (TC) and total revenue (TR) in relation to fishing effort for the fisheries  
 
 In conclusion, the results from the Verhulst-Schaefer models show that the fishing effort 
in 2016 was more than 1.5 times the fishing effort corresponding to the MSY and 1.6 times 
higher than the corresponding MEY.  If ecosystem externalities are partly taken into account, 
the fishing effort will be more than 1.88 times the fishing effort corresponding to the MSY and 
MEY. These results are consistent with previous studies and the statistical trend of catch per 
unit of effort (CPUE), which is declined from 1.2 to 0.4 ton/HP/year between 1985 and 2010 
(Tuan 2012, GSO 2014). The potential for green growth of the fisheries or the resource rent at 
MEY is estimated at about 168,000 billion VND (7.3 billion USD)2. The potential for green 
growth of the fisheries is higher than the export value for fisheries products in Vietnam in 2016 
(about 7.05 billion USD).  
 
4. Discussion 
 Green growth is defined as fostering economic growth and development while ensuring 
that natural assets continue to provide the resources and environmental services on which our 
well-being relies. It is hard to achieve the green growth in	 a	 society	with	 (presumably)	
continued	 growth	 in	 population	 and	 affluence,	 leading	 to	 more	 demand	 for	 fish.	 The	
marine	capture	fisheries	in	Vietnam	is	not	an	exception.	The results show that the green 
growth path appears to not be occurring in the Vietnamese marine capture fisheries. Policies 
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are needed to move the fisheries from the current situation where fishing is unsustainable to 
one where fishing effort corresponds to the reference points (EMSY and EMEY) (Figure 4, 5). In 
addition, all ecosystem externalities such as habitat degradation by using destructive fishing 
gears, crowding fishing, bycatch of forage species or juveniles of the target species need to be 
corrected in order to increase the productivity of the fisheries (e.g reducing trawlers). Nielsen 
et al. (2014) have defined the potential policies to achieve the green growth in fisheries, 
including public subsidies to environmental friendly industries, raising prices and economic 
optimal regulation of market failures. OECD has also proposed different policies to achieve the 
green growth in fisheries (OECD 2015). These policies include improving governance and 
energy efficiency in the capture fisheries sector, reducing waste in the capture fisheries  sector 
and changing in the value of fish. These potential policies for the marine capture fisheries  in 
Vietnam will be discussed as follows. 
 
4.1. Public subsidies to environmental friendly industries 
 Gillnet, longline and trawl are the main fishing gears in Vietnam. Among these fishing 
gears, trawl is the least selective fishing gear and the most harmful fishing gear for habitats. 
In 2012, there were about 20, 000 trawlers (single and pair), accounting for about 18% of the 
total fishing vessels in Vietnam. Most of the trawlers are small scale and exploit coastal areas. 
Zweig et al. (2005) estimated that “trash” (i.e. non marketable) fish landings of trawlers were 
between 50 and 70 percent and were mainly used for direct feeding to fish or livestock or for 
conversion into fish sauce. “Trash” fish landings are likely to increase in the future, unless 
trawl net designs are modified to reduce catches of small fish (Zweig, Thong et al. 2005). 
“Trash” fish could also be reduced over time by regulation with phase out of old small mesh 
nets and replacement by large mesh nets with little cost to the fishers. The number of small 
fishing boats which are less selective, illegal and inefficient must decrease in coastal areas. 
Fishermen could switch to other sustainable livelihoods such as  organic aquaculture, 
responsible tourism and organic farming and some other appropriate trades to compensate for 
reduced income and seafood protein availability due to reduced inshore fisheries production. 
 If the number of trawlers and the fishing pressure in coastal areas were significantly 
reduced and trawl nets were modified to be more selective, habitats would be less degraded 
and the carrying capacity (K) of the fisheries would be increased as demonstrated by 
application of the Verhulst-Schaefer model to the Vietnamese marine fisheries. The bycatch 
of the fisheries would also be decreased so that the sustainable economic rent in equation (9) 
will increase. K increase by 20% in response to these technology improvements (Figure 6).  
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Figure 6. Present and potential yield of the Vietnam marine fisheries  with technology 
improvement 
 
4.2. Raising the price of landed fish 
 Edwards et al (2004) estimated “trash” fish landings at 33 percent of total marine fish 
landings in Vietnam. The fisheries in the South-Western area of Vietnam had the highest 
proportion of “trash” fish (averaging around 60% of the catch), compared to just 5% in central, 
and 14% in northern regions (Edwards, Tuan et al. 2004). “Trash” fish quality is poor3 so 
reducing “trash” fish catches is a potential mechanism to increase prices of landed fish. In 
addition, current government policy is to ease the pressure on coastal resources by further 
developing the industry through better utilization of deep-sea resources4. The government has 
embarked on a program to shift the focus from inshore to offshore fishing by increasing 
incentives, such as loans and grants, to enable fishermen to shift their production away from 
inshore fishing. Oceanic tuna species are offshore target species which fishers have been 
encouraged to exploit due to their high export values. Figure 7 shows potential TR for the 
Verhulst-Schaefer model when the price of landing fish rises (20%). 
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Figure 7. Present total revenue (TR), total cost (TC) and potential total revenue for the 
fisheries  in response to a fish price increase of 20% 
 
4.3. Optimal regulations. 
 Vietnamese marine fisheries  are regulated according to the size of the boat engine and 
the location of fishing activity (Decree 33/2010/ND-CP, Article 5). Boat operators are required 
to obtain a marine fishing license depending on their operation zones, the size of the boat 
engine, and the gear type employed, as well as various other conditions. The fee levied is 
proportional to the engine size of the boat. Boats under 0.5 Gross Register Tonnage (GRT) are 
exempt from any license payment. The procedure for license applications is widely considered 
to be relatively straightforward, and a license application generally leads to a license being 
granted. In this case, Vietnamese marine capture fisheries  can be viewed to be in an ‘open 
access’ or unregulated situation (McCoy, Thurlow et al. 2010). The government has been 
attempting to reduce the fishing effort in coastal areas. However, the results were not satisfied 
due to poor coordination and lack of clear demarcations between authorities, a poorly developed 
scientific basis for management, and scarcity of investment funds. The governance system now 
purely reflects the diversity, complexity, and dynamic of the fisheries. For example, top down 
management is dominant in the fisheries. In coastal provinces, local fisheries administration 
authorities are Provincial Agriculture and Rural Development Departments, they are units of 
the Provincial People's Committees and under the professional management of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD). There is only one official organization of 
fishermen, Vietnam Fisheries Society (VINAFIS), which is a government-sponsored 
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organization (It was established follow Decision No. 33/2000/ QÐ- BTCCBCP, Date 5/5/2000, 
of Minister of Civil Affairs). At present there are also no specific regulations for bycatch and 
discard reduction of trawl fisheries in Vietnam. In addition, agencies such as the provincial 
Departments of Capture Fisheries and Resource Protection (SubDecafireps) lack staff and 
budget resources to provide the required management, monitoring, surveillance and regulation 
enforcement in both Vietnam’s inshore and offshore waters. With increasing population 
pressure and the development of more effective (and/or destructive) fishing gears, inshore 
resources have been increasingly over-exploited. In this situation, a policy of population 
stabilization and co-management, the sharing of responsibility for resources management 
between local communities and government agencies, may be a better option for improved 
resource management (Zweig, Thong et al. 2005). At local level, there is a need to organize for 
collective, representative participation in governance. This necessitates the building of capacity 
and competencies. Multiple categories of fishers’ organizations should be established according 
to need such as geographically-based categories5. Almost two decades ago Ruddle (1998) 
argued, "Given the problems of managing the diverse and often remote fishing communities 
along the very long end ecologically varied coastline of Vietnam, it would now seem opportune 
to make selective use of the marine ecological knowledge and management system of local 
fishers, by involving them in the design, implementation, monitoring, and enforcement of local 
rules and regulation aimed at national and provincial fisheries policy". While beyond the direct 
scope of this analysis, it must also be recognized that numerous foreign fishing boats continue 
to fish illegally in Vietnam’s marine waters, with an annual catch estimated at about 100,000 
tons (FAO 2005), despite bilateral agreements between Vietnam and neighboring countries 
(e.g. China, Thailand). While only 2.2% of the Vietnamese catch, this illegal fisheries  impacts 
heavily on specific fisheries (e.g longline fisheries) and is increasing rapidly. Thus, 
sustainability of Vietnam’s marine fisheries also requires the support and cooperation of 
neighbouring countries.   
5. Conclusion 
 In this paper, we have assessed sustainable development and the potential for green 
growth in the marine capture fisheries in Vietnam. Standard bio-economic models with 
additional terms to correct some of ecosystem externalities are applied to Vietnam's marine 
capture fisheries, which are both small scale and multi-species. Aggregate catch and effort data 
from 1976 to 2016 and other economic data of the fisheries were collected to estimate the 
potential green growth for the fisheries. The results show that fishing effort since 2012 has 
exceeded the fishing effort at MSY. Current fishing effort is more than 1.5 times greater than 
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the fishing effort corresponding to the MSY and more than 1.6 times greater than the fishing 
effort corresponding to the MEY. If ecosystem externalities are taken into account, the situation 
is even worse. Thus, fishing in Vietnam is unsustainable; the potential for green growth of the 
fisheries is estimated at about 7.3 billion USD, higher than the export value for fisheries 
products in Vietnam in 2016. Green growth policies for the fisheries include public subsidies 
to environmentally friendly industries, raising the prices of landed fish and more efficient and 
effectively enforced regulations.  
 The results were derived from the simple, rather old and theoretical models and lack of 
data observations which may not fully grasp the dynamics of a complicated system. Better 
methods of measuring effort and controlling other factors should also be investigated in order 
to have more precise estimates of the model parameters*. How to reduce effort and cost/benefit 
of reducing effort to achieve the reference points should also be studied further in order to 
improve proposal regulations. 
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